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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2-2(3) (j) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Did the Trial Court err in ruling that the acts of 
defendants James and Asay were not the proximate cause of 
the pursuit or the collision? 
II. Do Utah Code Sections 63-30-7(2) (amended 1990 and repealed 
1991) and 63-30-10(15) provide immunity for defendants? 
III. Are these defendants immune pursuant to the discretionary 
function exception to the waiver of immunity found in 
§3-30-10(1), Utah Code Ann.? 
These defendants adopt by reference the standards of 
appellate review as set forth in Plaintiff's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These defendants adopt Plaintiff's Statement of the Case 
with the exception of Plaintiff's characterization of- Brad James 
and Ed Asay as pursuing police officers. There is no evidence to 
support this statement. The only pursuing officer was Highway 
Patrolman Ken Colyar. Officers Brad James and Ed Asay simply 
fell in behind Colyar and followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants adopt Plaintiffs Statement of Facts with the 
following additions and exceptions: 
When Steven Floyd first saw Utah Highway patrolman Ken 
Colyar in his marked patrol car near the North Santaquin exit, he 
panicked because he was in a stolen car and did not have a 
driver's license. R. 1029, 1033, 1095-1097 (Floyd deposition, 
pp. 39, 43, 105-107) 
Colyar initially decided to pursue the Floyd vehicle because 
it was speeding, had tinted windows, no front license plate, and 
a young driver. Trooper Colyar was suspicious that the vehicle 
might have been stolen, or being used to transport contraband. 
Colyar decided, within a short distance up State Road 6, that 
Floyd was also guilty of felony evading, that is, fleeing a 
police officer and going more than 40 miles an hour over the 
posted speed limit. 
R. 652-655 (Colyar deposition, Vol. I pp. 78-82) 
The first officer to become involved, other than Trooper 
Colyar, was Officer Mellin of the Payson City Police Department. 
Mellin was driving a fully marked Chevrolet Caprice police car 
with overhead lights operating, and was sitting at a downtown 
intersection. Floyd went around the Payson police car, and 
continued on toward Salem, with Colyar close behind. Colyar 
assumes that Mellin fell in somewhere behind, but doesn't know 
for sure. R. 944-948 (Colyar deposition Vol. II. pp. 67-71) 
Floyd describes the first city police car that he saw as 
being marked, with lights and sirens on, and either white, light-
blue or gray. That car pulled out like it was attempting to get 
in Floyd's way; Floyd went around it with no problem, and as he 
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went around, the Highway Patrol car was still right on his 
bumper. R. 1103-1104 (Floyd deposition pp. 113-114) 
After going around the Payson vehicle, neither Floyd nor 
Colyar ever saw it again. R. 1049, 1106; (Floyd deposition pp. 
59, 116) R. 681-682 (Colyar deposition Vol. I pp. 108-109) 
The pursuit continued on to Salem, at which time Officer 
Brad James, driving a marked white Ford LTD police car, tried to 
get in Floyd's way. Again, Floyd simply went around him, with 
Trooper Colyar close behind. James's police car had its overhead 
lights on, and was going in the same direction. Floyd and Colyar 
passed James's police car on the left, and continued on their 
way. R. 699-701 (Colyar deposition Vol. I pp. 126-128) R. 949-
952 (Colyar deposition Vol. II pp. 72-75) Colyar believes that 
James fell in behind them, but doesn't know for sure, and never 
saw James in his rear view mirror. R. 953 (Colyar deposition 
Vol. II p. 76) 
In Spanish Fork, Officer Ed Asay placed his marked Chevrolet 
sedan police vehicle at the intersection of Highway 6 and 400 
South with his overhead lights on. He pulled out into the lane 
in which Floyd was traveling, but Floyd merely changed lanes and 
went around Asay's police car, as did Colyar. R. 790-791; 
(Colyar deposition Vol. I pp. 216-217); R. 967 (Colyar deposition 
Vol. II p. 90) Colyar never saw the Asay police vehicle again 
prior to the accident. R. 968 (Colyar deposition Vol. II p. 91) 
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Floyd's testimony is somewhat unclear and inconsistent with 
Colyar's. He recalls seeing the first police car in the vicinity 
of the first town, presumably Payson, and remembers seeing some 
additional police cars, perhaps two, in the next town. The cars 
were along the side of the road with their lights and sirens 
going, as if they were trying to get him to stop. He simply went 
past or around them and did not see them again. R. 1055-1056 
(Floyd deposition pp. 65-66). He describes the other encounters: 
Q. Let's just be clear here. Trooper Colyar starts the 
pursuit. It's just you and him. Then this 
first police car pulls out; you go around it. 
Colyar goes around it and the chase 
continues. Did you ever see the first police 
car again, to your knowledge? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Then you go into one of these other towns and these two 
other police cars appear, do whatever it is 
they do, apparently try to get you to stop? 
A. Un-huh (yes). 
Q. They've got their lights and sirens going? 
• * * 
A. Yes, yes, sorry. 
Q. And again, you go around them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With no particular problem? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Trooper Colyar again is right behind you, right? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And as I understand your testimony, you never saw those 
two cars again before the accident? 
A. That's correct. 
R. 1106-1107 (Floyd deposition pp. 116-117) 
On 1-15 from the North Spanish Fork on-ramp to the 
University Avenue exit in Provo, Colyar did not see any of the 
city police cars behind him. From what he heard on the radio, he 
believed Asay and James had backed off somewhere back around 
Springville. R. 968-969 (Colyar deposition Vol. II pp. 91-92) 
After Floyd got back onto the freeway, the only police cars 
he saw were Colyar's patrol car and a white Bronco with flashing 
lights either behind or to the side of Trooper Colyar. The white 
Bronco was a Utah County Sheriffs vehicle. R. 1070-1073 (Floyd 
deposition pp. 80-83) R. 915 (Colyar deposition Vol. II p. 38) 
The only police car that Floyd ever observed pursuing him, 
other than Trooper Colyar in the Highway Patrol car, was the 
white Bronco, which he only saw after he reentered the freeway at 
Spanish Fork. R. 1059, 1070 (Floyd deposition pp. 69, 80) 
It was Floyd's intention during the entire pursuit to evade 
the Highway Patrolman. Regardless of Floyd's speed, the Highway 
Patrol car was always right behind him. It was Floyd's intent to 
drive as fast as he could, so long as the Highway Patrolman was 
in sight, and it didn't make any difference how many other police 
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vehicles were involved. Floyd's testimony is clear that, after 
he passed them, he did not know whether the Salem and Spanish 
Fork police officers were in any way involved in the pursuit. 
R. 1106-1107 (Floyd deposition pp. 116-117) Their sole 
involvement was to make their presence known, but Floyd and 
Colyar would simply go around them, leaving them, perhaps, to 
simply fall in behind. 
Q. So it was your intention during the entire pursuit from 
when the Highway Patrolman first turned around and 
started to follow you, in the vicinity of Santaquin, it 
was your intention to get away from him to where he 
could see you, could see the car, and you were going to 
abandon the car and head off on foot, correct? 
A. Yes. R. 1113 (Floyd deposition p. 123) 
* * * 
Q, All right. So it was always your intent to leave the 
Highway Patrol car and other than a brief moment as you 
entered the on-ramp and had your problem with the semi, 
he was always right on your bumper? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I mean not literally, but somewhere within --
A, Two to three car lengths. 
Q. Somewhere between a hundred yards or a car length or 
two? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And regardless of whether he was one car length behind 
you or 200 yards, if he was ever that far, your traffic 
and driving pattern was the same, that is, you went as 
fast as that Buick would take you so long as you could 
negotiate the traffic? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And it wouldn't make any difference to you whether it 
was just the Highway Patrol car behind you, or whether 
you had five police cars lined up behind the Highway 
Patrol car; is not that true? 
A. Yes. R. 1114-1115 (Floyd deposition pp. 124-125) 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECIDED THAT THE 
ACTS OF DEFENDANTS SALEM CITY CORPORATION, 
BRAD JAMES, SPANISH FORK CITY CORPORATION AND 
ED ASAY WERE NOT THE CAUSE, PROXIMATE OR 
OTHERWISE, OF THE PURSUIT OR THE COLLISION. 
Plaintiff argues that negligence and proximate cause issues 
are factual and should not be resolved as a matter of law. But 
in Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 
1985) this Court said that while issues of negligence ordinarily 
present questions of fact to be resolved by the fact finder, when 
the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be 
drawn therefrom, such issues become questions of law. 
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611 
P.2d 363 (Utah 1980), cited by plaintiff, this Court recognized 
that in appropriate circumstances summary judgment may be granted 
on the issue of proximate cause: 
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We recognize at the outset that in appropriate 
circumstances summary judgment may be granted on the 
issue of proximate cause. Id. at 365 
This Court went on to say, however, that in a situation 
involving independent intervening cause, the primary issue is one 
of the foreseeability of the subsequent negligent conduct of a 
third person, and in such a case the issue must be resolved by 
the finder of fact. 
This, however, is not such a case. Plaintiff suggests that 
in this case, one of the critical issues is whether the conduct 
of the fleeing driver constitutes an independent intervening 
cause which excuses the conduct of Trooper Colyar and/or Officers 
James and Asay as a proximate cause of the accident in question, 
suggesting of course that it does not; and further suggesting 
that the acts of the fleeing suspect and of all defendants were 
"co-proximate causes" of the pursuit and the collision. 
In cases involving independent, intervening cause, the 
primary issue is one of foreseeability of the subsequent 
negligent conduct of a third person. Where there is no causation 
in fact, however, the issue of foreseeability never arises. 
The standard definition of "proximate cause" is "that cause 
which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without 
which the result would not have occurred." The two elements of 
proximate cause are cause-in-fact and foreseeability. This Court 
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noted the essential elements of a negligence action in Williams 
v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985): 
(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the 
defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that 
duty; (3) the causation, both actually and 
proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering 
of damages by the plaintiff. 
In determining whether there is causation "in fact", many 
courts use the "but for" test. That test is, simply, whether 
"but for the defendant's conduct, the event would not have 
occurred, or conversely, that the defendant's conduct is not the 
cause of the event if the event would have occurred without the 
defendant's conduct." See, e.g., Young v. Flathead County. 757 
P.2d 772 (Mont. 1988). 
If we assume, contrary to the evidence, that the acts of 
James and Asay concurred in some fashion with those of Trooper 
Colyar to bring about the ultimate event, then it would be proper 
to apply the "substantial factor" test. That test may be stated: 
the defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a 
material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about. 
The 'substantial factor' formulation is one 
concerning legal significance rather than 
factual quantum. Such a formulation, which 
can scarcely be called a test, is an 
improvement over the 'but for' rule for this 
special class of cases. It aids in the 
disposition of these cases and likewise of 
two other types of situations which have 
proved troublesome. One is that where a 
similar, but not identical, result would have 
followed without the defendant's act; the 
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other where one defendant has made a clearly 
proved but quite insignificant contribution 
to the result, as where he throws a lighted 
match into a forest fire. In the great 
majority of cases it produces the same legal 
conclusion as the but for test. Except in 
the classes of cases indicated, no case has 
been found where the defendant's act could be 
called a substantial factor when the event 
would have occurred without it; nor will 
cases very often arise where it would not be 
such a factor when it was so indispensable a 
cause that without it the result would not 
have followed. 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed., pp. 267-268. 
Under either test, it is clear that the acts of James and 
Asay were not the "cause in fact" of the collision. Plaintiff 
cannot meet her burden of showing that the conduct of these 
defendants was a substantial causative factor that led to the 
ultimate accident. 
There is no evidence that anything that either Officer James 
or Officer Asay did was the cause-in-fact of Floyd's reckless 
driving and the resulting collision. While they made their 
presence known, it is undisputed that Floyd easily avoided both 
Officer James and Officer Asay, continuing on his way, driving as 
fast as he could, and that he would continue to do so as long as 
Trooper Colyar was in sight, which he always was. 
There is no evidence that the acts of Officers James and 
Asay caused Floyd to speed up, slow down, change his route, or 
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otherwise influence his behavior or his driving pattern in any 
respect whatsoever. Once Floyd passed Officers James and Asay, 
he did not ever see their police cars again prior to the 
accident. Thus, there is simply no causal relationship between 
the acts of Officers James and Asay and the ultimate collision. 
"When the proximate cause of an injury is left to 
speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law." Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985). The facts of 
this case do not leave even the slightest room for speculation as 
to causation. Reasonable minds cannot differ as to the certainty 
that the pursuit would have continued, and the collision 
occurred, regardless of the involvement of Officers James and 
Asay. Since the accident would have occurred in any event, the 
first element of proximate cause, that is, "cause in fact," is 
not present. 
The second element of proximate cause, foreseeability, has 
no application to these facts. In this case, Floyd's negligent 
conduct did not commence subsequent to the conduct of these 
defendants. Floyd's negligent conduct was a continuing activity 
which began before and continued after the involvement of these 
defendants. The subsequent negligent conduct necessarily 
required to be foreseen by these defendants is Floyd's continued 
efforts to flee and elude these defendants. Floyd has testified 
that he was not fleeing these defendants at the time of the 
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accident. He could not have been because he was not even aware 
of their participation in the continuing pursuit. Thus, the 
actions of these defendants did not influence Floyd and 
independent intervening cause is therefore not at issue. 
In Ducote v. Jackson, 542 So.2d 689 (La. 1989), the 
plaintiffs' vehicle was hit by a fleeing criminal suspect who was 
being chased by city police. State troopers received a radio 
call that city police were involved in a chase and fell in 
behind, but were never advised of the reason for the chase. 
Plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the state 
troopers, who were granted summary judgment. On appeal, the court 
rejected the claim that plaintiffs probably would not have been 
involved in the accident but for the fact that the state troopers 
joined in the chase. In affirming summary judgment for the state 
troopers, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana held: 
We cannot conclude that Mr. and Mrs. 
Ducote probably would not have been involved 
in the accident but for the fact that the 
troopers joined the chase. The troopers' 
actions were not a substantial factor in 
causing the accident. The troopers' conduct 
was not the antecedent without which the 
accident would not have occurred. Their 
actions were not the cause in fact of the 
accident. Without causation there can be no 
liability. 
542 So.2d at 690,691. 
Plaintiff cites Brown v. Pinellas Park, 557 So.2d 161 (Fla. 
App.2 Dist. 1990), for the proposition that a question of fact 
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exists as to whether all officers involved in a pursuit should 
bear responsibility for the consequences of the continued 
pursuit. 
Brown is distinguishable from the facts of this case. Brown 
ultimately involved fifteen officers in active pursuit. The 
court described the entourage as a speeding caravan. An order to 
terminate the pursuit had been given and was disregarded. 
In this case, neither the Salem City officer nor the Spanish 
Fork officer initiated the chase. Neither officer was ever in a 
position as the primary unit in the pursuit. There was no 
speeding caravan. Highway Patrol Officer Colyar continued the 
pursuit as the primary unit without regard to participation, or 
lack thereof, from other officers. Furthermore, Floyd was not 
aware that any city police officer had fallen in behind Trooper 
Colyar. He never again saw either officer after passing through 
their individual towns, and each time he looked back,' it was only 
Trooper Colyar that he saw. 
Floyd must have known the city officers were pursuing him 
before their conduct could have influenced his conduct. 
Plaintiff did not, and cannot, establish one of the key elements 
of a negligence cause of action, that is, causation in fact. 
Even assuming cause-in-fact, neither the acts of James nor 
the acts of Asay were a "proximate cause" of the collision. 
Proximate cause is the limitation which the courts have placed 
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upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his 
conduct whether because of the application of notions of 
foreseeability, public policy, or mere common sense. 
Where the officer is in a non-contact vehicle many courts 
have held as a matter of law that the fleeing suspect's conduct 
is the sole proximate cause; that officers are not to be made 
insurers of the conduct of the culprits they chase; that officers 
are not obliged to allow offenders to escape and would, in fact, 
be derelict in their duty if they did not pursue offenders. See, 
e.g., Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky 1952); 
Paaels v. San Francisco, 135 Cal.App.2d 152, 286 P.2d 877 (1st 
Dist. 1955); Wrubel v. Tate of New York, 174 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1958); 
Miami v. Home, 198 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1967); Roll v. Timberman, 94 
N.J.Super. 530, 229 A.2d 281 (1967); Downs v. Camp, 113 
Ill.App.2d 221, 252 N.E.2d 46 (1969); Reenders v., Ontario, 68 
Cal.App.3d 1045, 137 Cal. Rptr. 736 (4th Dist. 1977); Fiser v. 
Ann Arbor, 107 Mich.App. 367, 309 N.W.2d 552, App.Gr. (Mich), 316 
N.W.2d 916 (1981); Thornton v. Shore, 233 Kan. 737, 666 P.2d 655 
(1983); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Who. 1986); Oberkramer v. 
City of Ellisville, 706 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Baidy v. 
Marah, 760 S.W.2d 195 (Mo.Ct.App. 1988); Doran v. City of 
Madison, 519 So.2d 1308 (Ala. 1988); Kennedy v. City of Spring 
City, 780 S.W.2d 164 (Tenn. 1989). 
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In DeWald, supra, an action was brought against the State of 
Wyoming and state highway patrol officers for the death of the 
driver of a vehicle stopped at a red light who was struck by a 
drunk driving suspect who had been fleeing from patrol officers. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the 
State and the officers, holding that: 
When a police officer pursues a fleeing 
violator and the violator injures a third 
party as a result of the chase, the officer's 
pursuit is not the proximate cause of those 
injuries unless the circumstances indicate 
extreme or outrageous conduct by the officer. 
To put it another way, the possibility that 
the violator will injure a third party is too 
remote to create liability until the conduct 
of the officer becomes extreme. 
719 P.2d at 650. 
In so holding, the Wyoming Supreme Court cited and 
specifically stated that it agreed with the analysis and holdings 
of Roll, supra, Chambers. supra. Reenders, supra, City of Miami, 
supra, and Thornton, supra.: 
[T]he majority view expressed in other 
jurisdictions in similar cases holds that the 
police officer is not liable. The reasoning 
which underlies the rejection of liability in 
these cases is two-fold: (1) it is the duty 
of a police officer to apprehend those whose 
reckless driving makes use of the highway 
dangerous to others; (2) the proximate cause 
of the accident is the reckless driving of 
the pursued, notwithstanding recognition of 
the fact that the police pursuit contributed 
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to the pursued's reckless driving. 
(Citations omitted) 
719 P.2d at 649, citing Roll, supra, at 284. 
In Doran, supra, occupants of a vehicle with which a pursued 
vehicle collided brought an action against the police officers 
and the city for injuries sustained in the collision. The court 
conceded that '[t]here can be little doubt that the high speed 
pursuit by the police officers contributed to [the suspect's] 
reckless driving. . .", but held that the actions of the driver 
of the pursued vehicle were the proximate cause of the injuries. 
Some jurisdictions hold that since there can be more than 
one cause of an occurrence, it is foreseeable that a police 
officer's pursuit could be a proximate cause of an injury to a 
third party injured by the pursued suspect, but no court which 
has held the conduct of a back-up or lagging officer, not 
actively involved in the pursuit, to be a proximate cause of a 
third party's injury. The facts of this case make it impossible 
for the actions of the officers from Spanish Fork and Salem City 
to be a proximate cause of Mr. Day's death. Their actions were 
far too remote and the trial court appropriately so ruled. 
Plaintiff points out to the Court that the depositions of 
Trooper Ken Colyar and fleeing suspect Steven Floyd constitute 
the only discovery which has been undertaken in the instant case. 
She argues that summary judgment must not be granted if discovery 
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is incomplete, since information sought in discovery may create 
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion. 
However, plaintiff filed no Rule 56(f) motion and made no other 
record that the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should 
have been delayed to allow for further discovery. 
In any event, plaintiff's rationale ignores the underlying 
elements of causation. Further discovery will not divulge any 
information which will create a genuine issue as to causation. 
Floyd must have known the city officers were pursuing him before 
their conduct could have influenced his conduct, and he has 
testified that he did not. 
Under the best of circumstances, plaintiff's depositions of 
the city officers may elicit an admission of intent to engage in 
the pursuit until the bitter end. The intent of the city 
officers, however, is not controlling. The actions of Floyd were 
not affected by anything the city officers did. He was 
completely unaware of their involvement and his behavior was not 
influenced by their involvement --or lack of involvement. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT BY VIRTUE OF 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 63-30-7(2) 
(AMENDED 1990 AND REPEALED 1991) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-30-7(2) provides blanket immunity 
to these defendants "for civil damages for personal injury or 
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death or for damage to property resulting from the collision of a 
vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the 
law who is being, has been, or believes he is being or has been 
pursued by a peace officer. . . . " 
Plaintiff's cause of action arose on the date of the 
accident, March 18, 1991. A tort cause of action accrues when it 
becomes remediable in the courts. Davidson Lumber v. Bonneville 
Investment, Inc.. 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). Plaintiff 
suggests that her cause of action became remediable in the courts 
on August 21, 1991, more than five months after the accident from 
which she claims injury, reasoning that a notice of claim is a 
precondition to suit and must be submitted within one year after 
the injury producing incident. Such claim is deemed denied 90 
days after submission, at which time the claimant may commence an 
action against a government entity or employee. 
Plaintiff filed her notice of claim on May 27, 1991, and it 
was deemed denied on August 21, 1991. According to plaintiff's 
reasoning, she could not commence this lawsuit before her claim 
was denied, and thus her cause of action became remediable in the 
courts only after the August 21, 1991 denial. It is on that date 
that she contends her cause of action accrued. 
The Immunity Act does not distinguish between accrual of a 
claim and accrual of a cause of action. The two are used 
interchangeably. A "claim" is defined as "any claim or cause of 
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action for money or damages . . .." §63-30-2(2) (emphasis 
supplied). Therefore, the Act does not contain different rules 
for determining when a "claim" arises and when a "cause of 
action" arises. 
Plaintiff's contention is also contrary to the express 
intent of the Legislature. In repealing §63-30-7, it stated: 
Section II. Informational Section. This act has 
prospective effect only and any changes to the law caused by 
this act do not apply to any claims based upon injuries or 
losses that occurred before the effective date of this act. 
L. 1991, Ch. 76, §11 (Addendum A). The Legislature expressly 
stated that the repeal of §63-30-7(2) did not affect claims for 
injuries that occurred before repeal. In this case, plaintiff's 
injuries occurred before repeal, so she cannot contend that §63-
30-7(2) is inapplicable. This provision of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity act was in effect at the time plaintiff's cause of 
action arose and is the controlling law for this case, barring 
plaintiff's cause of action. 
Plaintiff also claims that Utah Code Ann. §63-30-7(2) 
violates the open courts provisions, the equal protection 
provisions, and the due process provisions of the Utah 
Constitution, and thus is not controlling. 
A. SECTION 63-30-7(2) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE 
Utah's open courts clause permits the Utah Legislature to 
abrogate an existing remedy if one of two standards is satisfied. 
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First, there must be an "effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy" that is "substantially equal in value" to the eliminated 
remedy. Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
Second, in the absence of an alternative remedy, the abrogation 
stands only if (a) "there is a clear social or economic evil to 
be eliminated," and (b) the abrogation is not "an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id. 
Plaintiff contends that §63-30-7(2) eliminates an otherwise 
existing remedy at common law. She cites no authority for the 
proposition that she had a remedy at common law that was 
eliminated by §63-30-7(2). 
An essential element of a claim for negligence is an 
actionable duty of care owned by a defendant to a particular 
plaintiff. Weber v. Sprinaville City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 
19 86) . The existence of a legal duty is a question of law to be 
determined by the court. Id. 
Utah's Supreme Court has on two occasions addressed the 
issue of whether law enforcement officers owed actionable legal 
duties to enforce Utah's laws. In Obray v. Malmberg. 26 Utah 2d 
17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) the Court held that a sheriff had no 
actionable duty to investigate a burglary. In Christensen v. 
Hayward. 694 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1989) the Court held that a 
deputy had no duty to arrest a person who appeared to be 
attempting to operate a motorcycle while drunk. No Utah 
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appellate court has addressed the converse issue of whether a law 
enforcement officer has a duty not to enforce the law in certain 
circumstances. 
While there is no actionable duty to enforce the law, once 
an officer undertakes to enforce a law, reasonable care is 
required. 
The Utah Supreme Court has construed §41-6-14 to impose an 
actionable duty on emergency vehicle operators. See e.g. Howe v. 
Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159, 161 (1966). No Utah 
appellate court has held that this duty extends to persons who 
are injured by violators of the law who are attempting to elude 
emergency vehicles. All Utah decisions that construe §41-6-14 
involve a collision between the operator of an emergency vehicle 
and another car. 
In Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983), the Kansas 
court addressed the issue of whether a duty similar to that 
articulated in §41-6-14 extends to people injured by fleeing 
felons. The case involved a police pursuit of a speeder who 
refused to stop. Id. at 657. During the pursuit, the speeder 
committed other violations of the law including reckless driving, 
attempting to elude an officer, speeding, and running stop signs. 
Id. The pursuit ended when the speeder ran a stop sign and 
collided with another car. Two occupants of the other car were 
killed, and the father of one decedent sued the pursuing police 
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officer. Id. at 658. The officer was granted summary judgment. 
On appeal, the issue was whether the officer had liability under 
K.S.A. 8-1506, statute that parallels Utah Code Ann. §41-6-14. 
(Addendum B). 
The appellant's argument on appeal was that the officer had 
an actionable duty to abandon the continued pursuit of fleeing 
violators who engage in "extreme recklessness." Id. at 659. 
This contention was based on K.S.A. 8-1506 which granted certain 
immunities to emergency vehicle drivers but nevertheless required 
them to "drive with due regard for the safety of all persons 
using the highway," and did not immunize them from "reckless 
disregard for the safety of others." Id. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas rejected appellant's contention, 
holding that the officer had no duty to the decedent. It found 
that the immunities given to emergency vehicle drivers would be 
"hollow" if the test of due regard in the statute "were extended 
to include the acts of the fleeing motorist whom the officer is 
trying to apprehend." Id. at 661-62. Such extension, according 
to the court, would "make the officer the insurer of the fleeing 
violator, be he or she a mentally deranged person, prison 
escapee, murderer, drug addict or drunk." Id. at 662. 
The Thornton court went on to review decisions on the 
question from other jurisdictions. From Kentucky's highest court 
-22-
in Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589, 590-91, (Ky. 
1953) it quoted: 
To argue that the officer's pursuit caused Shearer [the 
fleeing violator] to speed may be factually true, but it 
does not follow that the officers are liable at law for the 
results of Shearer's negligent speed [collision with third 
car]. Police cannot be made insurers of the conduct of the 
culprits they chase. 
The Thornton court also noted the sound policy reasons for not 
extending an officer's duty to cover negligence of fleeing 
motorists. It quoted from State of West Virginia v. Fidelity & 
Cas. Co. of N.Y.. 263 F.Supp. 88 (D.W. Va. 1967): 
We are not prepared to hold an officer liable for 
damages inflicted by the driver of a stolen vehicle whom he 
was lawfully attempting to apprehend for the fortuitous 
reason only that the criminal drove through an urban area. 
To do so would open the door for every desperado to seek 
sanctuary in the congested confines of our municipalities, 
serene in the knowledge that an officer would not likely 
give chase for fear of being liable for the pursued's 
recklessness. Such is not now the law nor should it be law. 
After reviewing decisions from across the nation, the 
Thornton court adopted the "majority view" which holds that law 
enforcement officers are not liable for the acts of fleeing 
violators. Id. at 662. It specifically held that the "due 
regard" requirement only applied "to the police officer's 
physical operation of his own vehicle and not to the decision to 
chase or continue the chase of a law violator." Id. at 668. 
Since the Thornton decision other courts have refused to 
hold police liable for the recklessness of a fleeing motorist. 
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See DeWald v. State. 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1983) (decision to 
continue pursuit was not proximate cause of fleeing motorists' 
collision with another car); Kelly v. Tulsa. 791 P.2d 826 (Okla. 
App. 1990) (duty of care does not extend to decision to pursue 
fleeing motorist); Dent v. City of Dallas. 729 S.W.2d 114, 117 
(Tex. App. 1986) (following the "majority rule" that police 
officers have no liability to third parties who are killed by 
fleeing motorists). 
In the present case, defendants were operating emergency 
vehicles, patrol cars, at the time of the pursuit. They had 
activated their flashing lights and sirens. They are therefore 
entitled to the protections of §41-6-14. 
Officers James and Asay's duties under §41-6-14 should not 
extend to the negligent acts of the fleeing motorist, Steven 
Floyd. This would make them insurers of the acts of any fleeing 
suspects. It would allow any criminal to take refuge in the 
midst of a populated area, assured of the fact that an officer 
will not pursue because he may be held liable for the criminal's 
recklessness. 
The majority rule demonstrates that plaintiff does not have 
a remedy at common law. Therefore, the immunity conferred by 
§63-30-7(2) does not abrogate any right of plaintiff and the open 
courts clause does not apply. 
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B. PLAINTIFF'S EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE IS WITHOUT MERIT 
Plaintiff claims that §63-30-7(2) violates her rights under 
the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution. She claims 
to have been singled out because she cannot sue government 
defendants for her injuries, but those with claims arising before 
or after the period that §63-30-7(2) was effective can do so. 
This, she claims, is unequal treatment. 
As noted above, plaintiff did not have a cause of action for 
failure to terminate the pursuit of a fleeing motorist. No one 
had such a cause of action. Therefore, there is no unequal 
treatment. All citizens had the same rights before, during and 
after the period that §63-30-7(2) was in effect. 
C. SECTION 63-30-7(2) DOES NOT DENY DUE PROCESS 
Plaintiff contends that §63-30-7(2) deprives her of a remedy 
to sue government defendants for continuing the pursuit of Floyd. 
This abrogates her interest in having a day in court and 
therefore violates her due process rights under the Utah 
Constitution. She further contends that it is fundamentally 
unfair to apply §63-30-7(2) because the bill repealing it was 
approved by the Governor days before the accident. 
Since plaintiff never had a remedy for defendants' 




DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT BY VIRTUE OF 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 63-30-10(15) 
Assuming plaintiff's cause of action arose sometime after 
the bar effectuated by §63-30-7(2), or assuming §63-30-7(2) to be 
unconstitutional, defendants are immune by virtue of U.C.A. §63-
30-10(15). 
In 1991, when 63-30-7 was repealed, Section 63-30-10(15) was 
enacted, retaining immunity for the operation of an emergency 
vehicle while being driven in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 41-6-14. 
Section 41-6-14 exempts the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle, when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected 
violator of the law, from the usual traffic laws so long as the 
officer's vehicle sounds an audible signal or uses a visual 
signal and the officer acts "with due regard for the safety of 
all persons." 
There has been no allegation by the plainti-f that Ed Asay 
or Brad James violated any of the provisions of Section 41-6-14. 
Specifically, there is no allegation that either James or Asay 
exceeded the maximum speed limit, disregarded traffic signs or 
signals, or operated without audible or visual signals. The only 
allegations against James and Asay are that they joined in the 
chase at various times and for various distances. 
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The officers' duties or liabilities under Section 41-6-14 
should not extend to the reckless acts of a fleeing felon. Such 
an extension would make the officers and their employers insurers 
of the acts of any fleeing suspects. It would allow any criminal 
to seek refuge in the midst of a populated area, assured by the 
fact that an officer would not pursue because he may be held 
liable for the criminal's recklessness, an unrealistic extension 
of liability. 
The emergency vehicle statute has been in effect in Utah, in 
one form or another, since 1955; yet there is no Utah authority 
which applies the emergency vehicle statute to impose liability 
on a pursuing police officer for collisions between fleeing 
suspects and innocent third parties. 
Other jurisdictions have refused to extend liability to 
pursuing police officers for the reckless acts of the suspects 
they pursue, so long as the officers themselves comply with the 
emergency vehicle statute. 
In Thornton v. Shore, supra. the Supreme Court of Kansas 
held that an officer was entitled to the privileges and 
immunities granted by statute where he was operating his 
authorized emergency vehicle in full compliance with the 
requirements of the statute at the time of the accident, on the 
basis that the officer was not the insurer of the violator he was 
pursuing. 
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In Reenders v. Ontario. 68 Cal.App.3d 1045, 137 Cal. Rptr. 
736 (4th Dist. 1977), the California court stated that the 
emergency vehicle statute had nothing whatever to do with the 
case inasmuch as plaintiff's injury was not caused by any 
negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of any 
motor vehicle by an employee the defendant city within the 
meaning of the Act. The court pointed out that the facts did not 
indicate any negligent operation of the police vehicles, and that 
it was not the negligent operation of those vehicles of which the 
plaintiff complained, but rather that the officers were negligent 
in undertaking and continuing their pursuit. The court concluded 
that considerations of public policy preponderated against the 
imposition of any duty upon a municipality and its police 
officers to refrain from pursuing a lawbreaker who is already 
operating a vehicle on the public streets in a reckless and 
dangerous manner; a reasonable and just conclusion. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT BY VIRTUE OF 
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO THE 
WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FOUND IN UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, SECTION 63-30-10(1) 
These defendants adopt herein by reference the argument of 
the State of Utah, contained in POINT VIII of its Brief. 
-28-
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's ruling, granting summary judgment to all 
defendants. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Ch. 76 Laws of Utah- 1991 
CHAPTER 76 j 
S.B.No.218 | 
Passed February 27, 1991 j 
Approved March 14. 1991 
Effective April 29. 1991 \ 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
AMENDMENTS 
By Ronald J. Ockey j 
AN ACT RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL IM- I 
MUNITY; CLARIFYLNG THE SCOPE AND j 
COVERAGE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMU- I 
NITY: AND MAKING TECHNICAL CORREC- \ 
TIONS. ! 
I 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
63-30-4. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 129. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
63-30-3. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 139. LAWS 
OF UTAH 1965 
63-30-9. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 139. LAWS 
OF UTAH 1965 
63-30-10. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 
15 AND 319, LAWS OF UTAH 1990 
63-30-10.5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 75. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1987 
63-30-11. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1987 
63-30-33. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
220. LAWS OF UTAH 1989 
63-30-34. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1987 
63-30-36. AS LAST .AMENDED BY CHAPTER 30. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1987 
REPEALS: 
63-30-7. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 204. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1990 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-4. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as 
last amended by Chapter 129. Laws of Utah 1983, is 
amended to read: 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as ad-
mission or denial of liability — Effect of 
waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — 
Joinder of employee — Limitations on per-
sonal liability. 
\ 1) |_a_> Nothing contained in this chapter, unless 
specifically provided, [shall] may be construed as an 
admission or denial of liability or responsibility [m 
so far ag) by or for governmental entities or their em-
ployees [are concerned i. 
<b> If immunity from suit is waived by this chap-
ter, consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a pri-
vate person. 
(c > No cause of action or basis of liability is created 
by any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may 
any provision of this chapter be construed as impos-
ing strict liability or absolute liability. 
:2> Nothing in this chapter ishall! may be coo* 
strued as adversely affecting any immunity froafcv-
suit i which i that a governmental entity or employ^ 
may otherwise assert under state or federal law -^
'• 3 >' a i [The remedy 1 Except as provided in Subsec*, 
tion < b K an action under this chapter against a gpy^ 
ernmental entity or its employee for an injury -
caused by an act or omission [which] that occurs 
during the performance of [ saeh 1 the employee's du-
ties, within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority is),- after the effective date of thio oet;] a 
plaintiffs exclusive [ef| remedy. 
1
 b • A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other 
civil action or proceeding [by reason of] based upon 
the same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave 
rise to the claim, unless: 
•jj the employee acted or failed to act through 
fraud or malices j; or 
•' ii' the injury or damage resulted from the condi-
tions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36 !3)'c;. 
' 41 An employee may be joined in an action against 
a governmental entity in a representative capacity 
if the act or omission complained of is one for which 
the governmental entity may be liable, but no em-
ployee may be held personally liable for acts or omis-
sions occurring during the performance of the em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, unless it is established that 
the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
malice. 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-8. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 139. Laws of Utah 1965, is 
amended to read: 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous 
condition of highways, bridges, or other 
structures. 
[Immunity] Unless the injury arises out of one or 
more of the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
63-30-10. immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, o*> other structure located 
[thereon] on them. 
Section 3. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-9. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 139. Laws of Utah 1965. is 
amended to read: 
63-30-9, Waiver of immunity for injury from 
dangerous or defective public building, 
structure, or other public improvement — 
Exception. 
[Immunity] Unless the injury arises out of one or 
more of the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
63-30-10. immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused from a dan-
gerous or defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam. reservoir, or other public improve-
Laws of Utah-1991 Ch. 76 
Section 4. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as j 
last amended by Chapters 15 and 319. Laws of Utah I 
1990. is amended to read: | 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury j 
caused by negligent act or omission of em- j 
ployee — Exceptions. ! 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities j 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negli- j 
gent act or omission of an employee committed with- ! 
in the scope of employment except if the injury 
arises out of: j 
f 1) the exercise or performance or the failure to ex- I 
ercise or perform a discretionary function, whether I 
or not the discretion is abused: j 
• 2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false ar- ! 
rest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, j 
abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or ! 
violation of civil rights: j 
i 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation I 
of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, j 
or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval. 
order, or similar authorization; 
(4' a failure to make an inspection or by making an j 
inadequate or negligent inspection [of anv proper- j 
* ] ; ' j 
15 • the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or ; 
without probable cause: | 
<6» a misrepresentation by [the] an employee ! 
whether or not it is negligent or intentional: j | 
•7> or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, j 
public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil dis- ! 
turbances: 
< 8 • or in connection with the collection of and i 
assessment of taxes: j 
'• 9 • the activities of the Utah National Guard: j 
i 
' 101 the incarceration of any person in any state j 
prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal con- | 
fmement: < 
! 
11 any natural condition on [stato lands] public- \ 
ly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing : 
in connection with an abandoned mine or mining op- \ 
eration. or [aj the reiult of] any activity authorized j 
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry: j 
• 12' research or implementation of cloud manage- ! 
mem or seeding for the clearing of fog: for I j 
'13' the management of flood waters, earth- j 
quakes, or natural disasters: > 
• 14 • the construction, repair, or operation of flood ! 
<"• jtorm svstt*ms: ! 
: j 
< 15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 41-6-14: 
< 16 > a latent dangerous or latent defective condi-
tion of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located on them: 
' 17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condi-
tion of any public building, structure, dam, reser-
voir, or other public improvement: or 
[«4M <_18_) the activities of: 
'ai providing emergency medical assistance: 
•b> fighting fire: 
< c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes: 
!d) emergency evacuations: or 
<e» intervening during dam emergencies. 
Section 5. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-10.5. Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
as enacted by Chapter 75. Laws of Utah 1987. is 
amended to read: 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking 
private property without compensation. 
(1) [Immunity] As provided by Article I. Section 22 
of the Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when 
the governmental entity has taken or damaged pri-
vate property for public uses without just compen-
sation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed 
according to the requirements of Chapter 34. Title 
78. Eminent Domain. 
Section 6. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-11. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as 
last amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1987. is 
amended to read: 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Con-
tents — Service — Legal disability. 
< 1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations 
that would apply if the claim were against a private 
person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance of 
his duties, within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity before maintaining an action, re-
gardless of whether or not the function giving r:se to 
the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) < a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
M > a brief statement of the facts: 
(ii > the nature of the claim asserted: and 
mi»the damages incurred by the claimant so far 
as they are known. 
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<b) The notice of claim shall be: j 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that j 
peTson's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guard- i 
iani;j;and IshftH-feei ! 
«ii) directed and delivered to the responsible gov- ] 
ernrnental entity according to the requirements of j 
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) < a»If the claimant is under the age of majority, 
or mentally incompetent and without a legal guard-
ian fref4fftp«sefted] at the time the claim arises, the 
claimant may apply to the court to extend the time 
for service of notice of claim. 
< b M i) After hearing and notice to the governmen-
tal entity, the court may extend the time for service 
of notice of claim. 
<• ii' The court may not grant an extension that ex-
ceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
1
 c> In determining whether or not to grant an ex-
tension, the court shall consider whether the delay 
in serving the notice of claim will substantially prej-
udice the governmental entity in maintaining "its 
defense on the merits. 
Section 7. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-33, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as 
last amended by Chapter 220. Laws of Utah 1989, is 
amended to read: 
63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance 
for employees authorized — No right to 
indemnification or contribution from gov-
ernmental agency. 
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or all 
of its employees against liability, in whole or in pan. 
for injury or damage resulting from an act or omis-
sion occurring during the performance of an em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, regardless of whether or 
not that entity is immune from suit for that act or 
omission. 
<b> Any expenditure for that insurance is for a 
public purpose. 
c* Under any contract or policy of insurance [ex-
ccuted under authority of this section,] providing 
coverage on behalf of a governmental entity or em-
ployee for any liability defined by this section, re-
gardless of the source of funding for the coverage. 
the insurer has no right to indemnification or contri-
bution from the governmental entity or its employee 
[with respect to] for any loss or liability covered by 
the contract or policy. 
121 Any surety covering a governmental entity or 
its employee under any faithful performance surety 
bond has no right to indemnification or contribution 
from the governmental entity or its employee [with 
respect to] for any loss covered by that bond based on 
any act or omission for which the governmental en-
tity would be obligated to defend or indemnify under 
the provisions of Section 63-30-36. 
Section 8. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-34. Utah Code Annotated 1953} 
last amended by Chapter 75. Laws of Utah 198$ 
amended to read: 
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against 
governmental entity or employee — Insuft 
ance coverage exception. 
11) i a) Except as provided in Subsection (*£*] <2> j[ 
a judgment for damages for personal injury agauigf 
a governmental entity, or an employee whom a gov. 
ernmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceedi 
$250,000 for one person in any one occurrence, c* 
S500.000 for two or more persons in any one occur, 
rence. the court shall reduce the judgment to thai 
amountUJ. 
(b) A court may not award judgment of more thai 
$250.000 for injury or death to one person regard 
less of whether or not the function giving rise to thi 
injury is characterized as governmental. 
[<-2->] j£) Except as provided in Subsection [l&] (2), 
if a judgment for property damage against a govern-
mental entity, or an employee whom a governmen-
tal entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 
in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the 
judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the damage is charac-
terized as governmental. 
[f34] (2!) The damage limits established in this sec-
tion do not apply to damages awarded as compensa-
tion when a governmental entity has taken or dam-
aged private property for public use without just 
compensation. 
Section 9. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-36. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 30. Laws of Utah 1987, is 
amended to read: 
63-30-36. Defending government employee 
— Request — Cooperation — Payment of 
judgment. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections « 2 > and (3), a 
governmental entity shall defend any action 
brought against its employee arising from an act or 
omission occurring: 
iaj during the performance of the employee's du-
ties: 
•b; within the sco^e of the employee's employ-
ment; or 
'Ci under color of authority. 
•2Ma) Before a governmental entity may defend 
its employee against a claim, the employee shall 
make a written request to the governmental entity 
to defend him: 
<i» within ten days after service of process upon 
him: or 
' ii»within a longer period that would not prejudice 
the governmental entity in maintaining a defense 
on his behalf; or 
<iii> within a period that would not conflict with 
notice requirements imposed on the entity in con-
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miction with insurance earned by the entity relat- I 
Lg to the risk involved. i 
pftjdfthe employee fails to make a request, or fails J 
L, reasonably cooperate in the defense, the govern-
mental entity need not defend or continue to defend ! 
fcfce employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise. 
E»settlement against the employee in respect to the 
(31 The governmental entity may decline to de- 1 
ifend. or subject to any court rule or order, decline to ! 
Continue to defend, an action against an employee if ; 
gj"3etermines: 
(a) that the act or omission in question did not oc-
cur: ; 
(i» during the performance of the employees du-
ties; let] 
(ii) within the scope of his employment: or 
i 
(iii) under color of authority; [er] ; 
(bi that the injury or damage resulted from the 
fraud or malice of the employee: or 
(CJ that the injury or damage on which the claim 
was based resulted from: • 
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in ac-
tual physical control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater j 
by weight than the established legal limit; [er] 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any j 
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable , 
of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that rendered the person 
incapable of safely driving the vehicle: or ' 
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally im-
paired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his 
job function because of the use of alcohol, because of 
the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as 
defined in Section 58-37-4. or because of the com-
bined influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed con-
trolled substance as defined by Section 56-37-4. 
»4> (a> Within ten days of receiving a written re-
quest to defend an employee, the governmental en-
tity shall inform the employee whether or not it 
shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide a 
defense, the basis for its refusal. 
<b> A refusal by the entity to provide a defense 
Iskatt] is not [be] admissible for any purpose in the 
action in which the employee is a defendant. 
. 5 - itfj Except as provided in Subsection '6'. if a 
governmental entity conducts the defense of an em-
ployee, the governmental entity shall pay any judg-
ment based upon the claim!. or any compromise or 
settlement of the claim, except as provided-m- St*e~ 
seetion '6»1. 
«6i A governmental entity may conduct the de-
fense of an employee under (an agreement with the 
employee thatl a reservation of right> under which 
the governmental entity reserve? the ri«:hi not to 
pay a judgment, if the conditions set forth in Subsec-
tion < 3) are established. 
• 7 H a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37 
affects the obligation of a governmental entity to 
provide insurance coverage according to the re-
quirements of Subsection 41-12a-301 «3« and Sec-
tion 63-30-29.5. 
'bi}A] When a governmental entity 'may refuse! 
declines to defend, or declines to continue to defend. 
an action against its employee under the conditions 
set forth in Subsection 13 >, [b«] it shall still provide 
coverage up to the amount specified in Sections 
31A-22-304 and 63-30-29.5. 
Section 10. Repealer. 
Section 63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury 
from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Ex-
ception. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last 
amended by Chapter 204. Laws of Utah 1990. is re-
pealed. 
Section 11. Informational Section. 
This act has prospective effect only and any 
changes to the law caused by this act do not apply to 
any claims based upon injuries or losses that oc-
curred before the effective date of this act. 
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ADDENDUM B 
KANSAS STATUTES ANNOTATED 
COPR. (c) 1990 By the Revisor of Statutes of Kansas 
CHAPTER 8. AUTOMOBILES AND OTHER VEHICLES 
ARTICLE 15. UNIFORM ACT REGULATING TRAFFIC; RULES OF THE ROAD 
OBEDIENCE TO AND EFFECT OF TRAFFIC LAWS 
06. Authorized emergency vehicles; rights, duties and liability of drivers 
tereof. 
The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an 
•gency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the 
or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may 
:cise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the 
litions herein stated. 
The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this article; 
Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
l as may be necessary for safe operation; 
i Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as such driver does not endanger 
> or property; 
i Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in 
rified directions; and 
i Proceed through toll booths on roads or bridges without stopping for 
lent of tolls, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe 
ration and the picking up or returning of toll cards. 
The exemptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall 
.y only when such vehicle is making use of an audible signal meeting the 
lirements of K.S.A. 8-1738 and visual signals meeting the requirements of 
A. 8-1720, except that an authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police 
.cle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front 
:he vehicle. 
The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized 
:gency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all 
;ons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of 
:less disregard for the safety of others. 
:ory: L. 1974, ch. 33, s 8-1506; L. 1977, ch. 43, s 1; July 1. 
41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Applicability of traffic law 
to highway work vehicles — Exemptions-
CD The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to 
an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of 
the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may 
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger 
life or property; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning 
in specified directions. 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehi-
cle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 
41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is 
visible from in front of the vehicle. 
(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with 
regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the operator from the conse-
quences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges. 
(b) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter 
does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while 
actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the 
entire chapter applies to those persons and vehicles when traveling to or 
from the work. 
ADDENDUM C 
Laws of U t a h - 1 9 9 0 
CHAPTER 204 
S. B. No. 194 
Pa^ed February 19, 1990 
Approved March 12. 1990 
Effective April 23, 1990 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR 
DAMAGES OF POLICE PURSUED VEHICLE 
By Richard J, Cariing 
AN ACT RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL IM-
MUNITY; PRESERVING GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY FOR PEACE OFFICERS DRIV-
ING MOTOR VEHICLES EN PURSUIT OF 
ACTUAL OR SUSPECTED VIOLATORS OF 
THE LAW: AiND MAKING TECHNICAL COR-
RECTIONS. 
THIS ACT .AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
63-30-7. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 129, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-7. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 129, Laws of Utah 1983. :s 
amended to read: 
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from 
negligent operation of motor vehicles — 
Exception. 
(Dta) Immunity from suit of all governmental en-
tities is waived for injury resulting from the negli-
gent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or 
other equipment during the performance of his du-
ties, within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authoritytr-pfovttiGQ. however. the*-*his-3eetk>tt 
s4*t*m 
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation 
of emergency venicies as defined by law and while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 41-6-14. 
(2) ^ a) All governmental entities employing peace 
officers retain and do not waive immunity from li-
ability for civil damages for personal injury or death 
or for damage to property resulting from the colli-
sion of a vehicle being operated by an actual or sus-
pected violator of the law who is being, has been, or 
believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace 
otficer employea by the governmental entity in a 
motor vehicle. 
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor 
imply that this immunity was ever previously 
waived or this liability specifically or implicitly rec-
ognized. 
ADDENDUM D 
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused, 
(2) assault, battery, false impnsonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of 
civil rights, 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization, 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection, 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause, 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional, 
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances, 
(8) or m connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes, 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard, 
(10) the incarceration of any person m any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement, 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining oper-
ation, or any activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and For-
estry, 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog, 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disas-
ters, 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems, 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven m accor-
dance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14, 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bndge, viaduct, 
or other structure located on them, 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement, or 
(18) the activities of 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance, 
(b) fighting fire, 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or haz-
ardous wastes, 
(d) emergency evacuations, or 
(e) intervening dunng dam emergencies 
History: L. 1965, ch 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; 
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, 
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 
319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch 15, effective July 1, 1990, deleted 
the subsection designation (1) from the begin-
ning of the section, redesignated former Sub-
sections (l)(a) to (1)(1) as Subsections (1) to (13) 
and made related changes, and deleted former 
Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for 
violation of Fourth Amendment rights and 
making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78 
the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by 
such violations 
The 1990 amendment by ch 319, effective 
Julv 1 loon « J J J o i_ 
1991 added Subsections (13) through (17) and 
redesignated former Subsection (13) as present 
Subsection (18), inserted "violation or before 
"civil rights" in Subsection (2), deleted "of any 
property" following "inspection" m Subsection 
(4), made minor stylistic changes m Subsec-
tions (6) and (12) and rewrote Subsection (11), 
which read "anv natural condition on state 
lands or as the result of any activity authorized 
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry " 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1991, ch 76, 
which amended this section and §§ 63-30-4, 
63-30-8,63-30-9 63-30-10 5 63-30-11,63-30-
33, 63-30-34, and 63 30-36, provides m § 11 
that 'This act has prospective effect only and 
any changes to the law caused by this act do 
